The Structure, the Whole Structure and Nothing but the Structure? by Psillos, Stathis




“All right”, said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone.
“Well, I have often seen a cat without a grin”, thought Alice; “but a grin without a cat! It’s the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life!”
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland

1. Introduction. Structuralism in the philosophy of science comes in many brands and varieties. It ranges from a methodological thesis (concerning the nature of scientific theories and claiming that they are best understood as families of models) to a radical ontic position (concerning what there is and claiming that structure is all there is). In between, there is an epistemic view: there is more to the world than structure, but of this more nothing but its structure can be known. I have dealt in some detail with the intermediate epistemic position in my (2001). In this paper, I shall discuss the radical ontic position. Note that ontic structuralism (henceforth OS) is still quite an amorphous, though suggestive, position. The slogan is: “all that there is, is structure”  (da Costa and French 2003, 189). But then there are a number of claims of varying strengths. Here are a few of them. 

	We should abandon “the attempt to interpret physical theory in terms of underlying objects and properties of which the world is made”, and focus on “structures and relations directly” (Ladyman 2001, 73).
	Structures are primary to objects (cf. French & Ladyman 2003, 41). 
	The notion of objects should be reconceptualised in “purely structural terms” (op.cit., 37).
	“(T)here are no unknowable objects lurking in the shadows (...)” French (1989, 203).
	The objects play only “a heuristic role allowing for the introduction of the structures which then carry the ontological weight” (op.cit., 204). 
	“(T)he structural dissolution of physical objects leads to a blurring of the line between the mathematical and the physical” (French & Ladyman 2003, 41).
	“(T)he only non-structural understanding of the nature of such objects is metaphysical and unwarranted by the physics itself” (…)” (op.cit., 45). 
	 “(T)here are mind independent modal relations between phenomena (both possible and actual), but these relations are not supervenient on the properties of unobservable objects and the external relations between them, rather this structure is ontologically basic” (French & Ladyman 2003, 46).

Even a cursory look at these claims suggests that there different ways to read OS. Here are four interpretative candidates, concerning objects. Eliminative OS: there are no objects. Reconstructive OS: there are objects but they are reconceptualised in a structuralist way. Formal OS: structurally reconceptualised, ‘objects’ are mathematical entities. Semi-formal OS: it is only unobservable ‘objects’ that have to be reconceptualised structurally as mathematical entities. And then there is the issue of how to understand properties and relations. OS seems to waver between two positions. Mild OS: structure is ontologically basic in that it is not supervenient on the intrinsic properties of objects. Radical OS: structure is ontologically basic because there are no objects, and hence no intrinsic properties at all.
Presently, I will not examine these interpretative issues. Instead, I will focus on the slogan: all that there is, is structure. The slogan captures the spirit of OS, viz., pure structuralism. According to the slogan, ‘objects’ are, at best, positions in structures. If pure structuralism is found wanting, then interpretative work might help us work out a possibly defensible impure structuralist position. But this is a different issue. 
What makes French and Ladyman’s OS distinctive is that it means to be a realist position: ontic structural realism (OSR). The slogan aims to refer to the mind-independent structure of the world. This structure is also meant to be modal (or causal): hence modal ontic structural realism (MOSR). 
This paper takes issue with both OSR and MOSR. It is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 highlights a substantive non-structural assumption that needs to be in place before we can talk about the structure. Then, by drawing on some relevant issues concerning mathematical structuralism, it claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. But then pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is: the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, section 4 argues directly against ORS (and MOSR) that they lack the resources to accommodate causation within their structuralist slogan.

2. The structure. Structuralists often talk about the structure of a certain domain. Is this talk meaningful? If we consider a domain as a set of objects, then it should be clear that it can have any structure whatever. In particular, it can have a structure R isomorphic to another, independently given, structure R’, provided that the domain has enough objects. This can be seen in various ways. Given enough building blocks and rods, they can be arranged so that they have the structure of the London Underground or of the Paris Metro. Given that a whole can be divided in any number of parts, isomorphic structures can be defined on any two distinct wholes, for instance, a brick wall and the top of my desk. The operative notion here is the standard definition of similarity of structure: two classes A and B are similar in structure (isomorphic) iff there is an one-one correspondence f between the members of A and B and whenever any n-tuple <a1 … an> of members of A stand to relation P their image <f(a1) … f(an)> in B stands to relation f(P), where f(P) is the image of P in B. It is a consequence of this definition that any two similar classes (that is any two classes with the same cardinality) can have the same structure. Actually, a degenerate case of isomorphism obtains between any two similar classes, when no relations are defined on them. The upshot is that if we start with the claim that a certain domain D has an arbitrary structure R, and if we posit another domain D’ with the same cardinality as D’, it follows as a matter of logic that there is a structure R’ imposed on D’ which is isomorphic to R. This claim has been the motivating thought behind Newman’s critique of Russell’s structuralism and of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism (see Psillos 2001 and Demopoulos 2003). 
Things can be worse. Take Newtonian mechanics, where F=ma, and compare it with a reformulation of it, according to which F is always the vector sum of two more basic forces F1 and F2. Here we have two non-isomorphic structures, which are nonetheless, empirically equivalent. Which of them is the structure of the Newtonian world? Or consider the set S={1, 2, …, 12) and take R to be such that xRy if x evenly divides y. This structures the domain in a certain way: R is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive. But then, define R’ on S as follows: xR’y is 3 evenly divides (x-y). The structure of S is now different, since R’ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. The two structures are non-isomorphic (since they have different logical properties). Hence two similar classes can have different (non-isomorphic) structures. It might be that a certain structure (better, theory) is categorical. But first, even when this is effected, as in the case of second-order Peano-arithmetic, it is the product of certain well-known assumptions. And second, it cannot always and ab initio be assumed. 
Ergo, the structure of a domain is a relative notion. It depends, and varies with, the properties and relations that characterise the domain. Differently put, a domain has no inherent structure, unless some properties and relations are imposed on it. Or, two classes A and B may be structured by relations R and R’ respectively in such a way that they are isomorphic, but they may be also structured by relations Q and Q’ in such a way that they are not isomorphic.
Let’s use the terminology introduced by Dummett and Shapiro.​[1]​ Let’s call a ‘system’ a collection of objects with certain properties and relations. We may even call it a ‘relational system’ to emphasise the fact that it is so structured that it satisfies a certain condition, e.g., Peano’s axioms or Newton’s laws. A ‘structure’ then is the abstract form of this system. Focusing on structure allows us to abstract away all features of the objects of the system that do not affect the way they relate to one another. It is clear that the system comes already structured. We can then talk about its abstract structure, but this should not obscure the fact that this talk is parasitic on the system being a particular and already structured complex, that is a complex with some characteristic structure in virtue of the relations defined on it. 
This ushers in the basic structuralist postulate. Among the many structures that can characterise a system some is privileged. This is the structure of this system as specified by the relationships among the objects of the system. It is this postulate that renders talk about the structure of system meaningful.
Note that this postulate rests on a non-structural assumption. That a system has a definite structure (this rather than that) is the outcome of the fact that certain relations and not others characterise it. But that certain relations (and not others) structure a system is a basic non-structural property of this system. The issue then is what exactly makes a structure privileged. 
	Following Shapiro again, we might distinguish between two versions of structuralism. Ante rem structuralism has it that structures are abstract, freestanding, entities: they exist independently of systems, if any, that exemplify them. In a sense, they are like universals, more like Platonic universals, to be sure, than Aristotelian ones. In re structuralism takes systems as being ontically prior to structures: it denies that structures are freestanding entities. Structures are abstractions out of particular systems and claims about the structure are, in effect, to be understood in one of the following ways. Talk, say, about the natural-number structure is talk about any system that is structured in a certain way, viz., having an infinite domain, a distinguished element e in it and a successor function s on it such that the conditions specified by the Peano axioms are satisfied. Or, talk about the natural-number structure is talk about all systems that are structured in the above way.​[2]​ Both ways take talk about structure to be relative to systems, but the first takes the structure to be that of a certain system (admitting, however, that any other isomorphic system would do equally well, and hence admitting that none of them is privileged), while the second takes the structure to be a generalisation over all isomorphic systems. Both ways, however, take it that if there were no systems, there would be no structures. 
Two are the essential differences between ante rem and in re structuralism. The first is that ante rem structuralism posits extra structures. These are the freestanding structures, viz., the abstract patterns that may or may not be instantiated in any in re system. The worry then is this: which abstract patterns exist? It may be that this question can be answered when it comes to mathematical structures in a way that does not involve a prior commitment to in re structures. But it is difficult to see how this question can be answered if we take ante rem structuralism to be a thesis about the physical world. Like uninstantiated universals ante rem structures are not part of the causal order of the world. Any abstract pattern can exist without making any difference whatsoever to anything that happens in the world. And then again, no abstract pattern may exist, without noticing its absence. It seems plausible to think that those structures that are taken to exist (as abstract patterns) are abstractions of in re systems. 
The second difference between ante rem and in re structuralism concerns the role of objects in structures. Since in re structuralism focuses on relational systems, it takes the objects of a structure to be whatever objects systems with this structure have. In a sense, according to in re structuralism, there are no extra objects which ‘fill’ the structure if the latter is taken in abstraction from the systems to which it belongs. We can think of it in terms of what Shapiro call “places-are-offices”. Taken in an in re way, the structure of, say, the British Parliament consists in the relationships among certain offices, but the offices are occupied by certain individuals. The in re structure does not have Rt Hon Michael Martin and the Speaker of the House: he is the Speaker of the House. If we think of in re structures, it is obvious that the objects that ‘fill’ them have more properties than those determined by their interrelationships in the structure. They are given, and they acquire their identity, independently of the abstract structure they might be taken to exemplify. 
By hypostatising structures, ante rem structuralism introduces more objects: those that ‘fill’ the abstract structure. Actually, it introduces infinitely many more objects, since at least some structures have infinite places. Of these ‘new’ objects nothing is asserted apart from the properties they have in virtue of being places (or roles) in a structure. These places cannot be identified with the objects of any or all the in re structures that are isomorphic to the abstract pattern. This is what Shapiro calls “places-are-objects” perspective. The ‘fillers’ of the abstract (ante rem) structure are places, or positions, in the structure, yet if one considers the structure in and of itself, they are genuine objects. After all, they must be such since the abstract structure instantiates itself (cf. Shapiro 1997, 89). Since an instantiated abstract structure needs objects to be instantiated into, the places of the abstract structure must be objects.
	Since my target is physical structuralism, I will not discuss mathematical structuralism in any detail. But two general points are in order and relevant to what follows. First, mathematical structuralism does not view structures without objects. In this sense, it is not revisionary of the underlying ontology of objects with properties and relations. Actually, ante rem structuralism has been developed as a view which secures the existence of mathematical objects, like numbers. Second, ante rem mathematical structuralism takes numbers to have only those properties that are relevant to their being part of a structure. As Shapiro has put it: “The ante rem structuralist, at least, takes the ‘being’ and ‘intrinsic nature’ of natural numbers, for example, to be their relations to one another” (2004, 33). A few paragraphs before, however, Shapiro says: “All that matters about the natural numbers is the relationships to one another” (2004, 32). And later on he adds: “If one captures the structure, one captures everything of mathematical relevance”. Now, it is one thing to say that for the purposes of doing maths some properties of numbers are relevant while others are not and it is quite another thing to say that numbers have only those properties that are relevant to doing maths. For the purposes of classifying people in terms of their heights, height is the only relevant property. But people do have other properties as well. If the relevant properties of some objects are exactly those they need to have in order to be places in a certain structure, the structuralist ought to remain silent on the issue of whether these objects may or may not have other properties. They may have, though these properties are not relevant to the structure exemplified by these objects. And then again, they may not have. In any case, it is independently plausible that numbers do have non-structural properties: they are abstract, they are not spatio-temporal, they don’t cause anything etc.
	Intermediate moral: structures need objects. This holds for both ante rem and in re structuralism. These two kinds of structuralism might need different objects, but they both need them. Of these objects more can be asserted than that they have the properties they need to have in order to form a certain structure. This should be obvious if we think of in re structures. It may not be immediately obvious if we think of ante rem structures, but as noted above, this view is consistent with ante rem structuralism and independently plausible anyway.
The distinction between ante rem and in re structuralism may be used to cast some light on the question noted above, viz., what makes a certain structure privileged? Let’s assume, for the sake of the argument, that there are ante rem (freestanding) structures. It may be, one may argue, that what makes a structure R of a system S privileged (that is what makes it the structure R of system S) is that R is isomorphic to an ante rem structure R’. But there are problems with this thought. On the face of it, it seems regressive. For the question can be asked about ante rem structure R’: what makes this structure privileged? If the answer is that it is isomorphic to another ante rem structure R’’, we are led to regress. If the answer is different, some independent reason has to be given as to why an ante rem structure R’ is privileged. Perhaps, in pure maths the point is innocuous. Mathematicians define and study all sorts of structures and any structure, defined implicitly by a set of axioms, will do. For instance, does it matter to group theory that there are non-isomorphic groups? 
But things are more complicated when it comes to physical systems. Here ante rem structuralism is ill-motivated. For finding the structure of a natural system is an a posteriori (empirical) enterprise. Its structure is, if anything, in re. And it is a natural structure in the sense that it captures the natural (causal-nomological) relations among the objects of the system. It is the structure that delimits a certain domain as possessing causal unity. Hence, it is grounded on the causal relations among the elements of the domain. It is these facts (that the structure is in re and that it is natural) that make some structure privileged vis-à-vis all other structures that can be defined on the elements of a system. But then, it is surely odd to argue that a certain structure R is privileged because it is isomorphic to an abstract structure R’. First, it may not be. Given that the discovery of the in re structure is an empirical matter, it may not be isomorphic to any of a set of antecedently given ante rem structures. Second, even if the discovered in re structure turns out to be isomorphic to an ante rem one, the order of ontic priority has been reversed: the ante rem structure is parasitic on the in re; it is an abstraction from it.
Given the ontic priority of in re structures, the following observation seems compelling. Take an in re structure R and an ante rem one R’ which are isomorphic. Let us add that R is the structure of a concrete physical system and that R has a certain causal unity and role. R’ instantiates itself, but since it is ante rem, R’ has no causal unity and plays no causal role. Yet, R and R’ are isomorphic. It follows that the causal unity and the causal role of R are not determined by its structural properties, that is the properties it shares with R’ and in virtue of which it is isomorphic to R’. If it were so determined, R’ would have exactly the same causal unity and causal role as R. But it has not. So, if we take structures to be causal, we should not look to their structural properties for an underpinning of this causal unity and activity. 
This is not surprising, after all. Places in structures and formal relations do not cause anything at all. It’s the ‘fillers’ of the places and concrete (in re) relations that do. Besides, as Shapiro (1997, 98) rightly stresses, for an in re system to have the right structure it is not enough to be isomorphic to an abstract structure. The relations that structure it should be of the right, that is causally relevant, kind. And this is clearly not a structural property of them. Take, for instance, the structural similarity between an atom and the planetary system (explored by the Bohr model of the atom). Note, first, that an atom is not just any system that instantiates an abstract structure (e.g., having two places one of which ‘orbits’ around the other). The masses of the objects, their charges, their distance, their quantised energy levels etc. are what make a system an atom. After all, the earth-moon system is not an atom. And, second, though the formal similarity between Coulomb’s law and Newton’s law make it possible (and useful) to think of an atom and a planetary system as sharing structure, it is of great importance for understanding each system to go beyond their shared structure and to look into the nature of the relevant relations. Unlike Newton’s law, Coulomb’s law relates (negative and positive) charges and the intrinsic strength of a Coulomb interaction is much greater than the strength of a gravitational interaction. I don’t think it makes sense here to say that the atom and the solar system exemplify the same abstract (ante rem) structure. At best, the two systems simulate each other.
Consider what Ladyman (2001, 74) says: “(T)here is still a distinction between structure and non-structure: the phenomena have structure but they are not structure”. And French & Ladyman (2003a, 75) claim: “What makes a structure ‘physical’? Well, crudely, that it can be related—via partial isomorphisms in our framework—to the ‘physical’ phenomena. This is how ‘physical’ content enters”. I don’t know what the single quotes really mean to imply. Claims such as these still waver between an ante rem and an in re understanding of structures. But they seem to concede the point that structuralism cannot be pure: the phenomena are able to give ‘content’ to a structure precisely because they are not themselves structure. 
Moral: To be able to talk meaningfully about the structure (of anything) OS needs to respect the basic structuralist postulate. But this compromises pure structuralism. OS will take structures to be either ante rem or in re. But objects are needed in either case. If OS reifies ante rem structures, their causal unity, role and efficacy are cast to the wind. If OS gives ontic priority to in re structures, as it should, there is more to the world than structure.​[3]​ 

3. The whole structure. Assuming that a certain natural domain has a structure, can this structure be known and is it necessary for science to discover the whole of it? Structural empiricism (one form of which is constructive empiricism) allows that a part of it, the structure of appearances, can be known, but denies that science should or need aim at knowing more of it. Structural empiricism stresses that a theory is successful if the structure of appearances is isomorphically embedded in a model of the theory. This way of putting things allows that the theory is empirically adequate if it captures just the (abstract) structure of appearances. But there is nothing in structural empiricism that prohibits it from arguing that appearances are identical to the empirical sub-model of the theory. Indeed, being an empiricist position, it is at least consistent with the claim that appearances are knowable, that is to say that the objects that constitute the appearances as well as their (observable) properties and relations are knowable. So structural empiricism (and in particular constructive empiricism) is not pure structuralism. It’s not revisionary of the idea that appearances consist of (observable) objects with (observable) properties and relations: it takes appearances to be in re structures. These in re structures are knowable (at least in principle). If they were not, no theory could save them. 
	Structural realism is more optimistic than structural empiricism, at least in principle. It claims that the structure of the world behind the appearances is no less knowable. This position is realist because it has it that there is a world ‘behind’ the appearances that has a structure. And it is structuralist because it claims that of this world only its structure can be known. In its Russellian stripe, structural realism claims that there is an inferential route, from the structure of appearances to the structure of their (unobservable) causes, based on the claim that the appearances and their causes have the same structure. But this programme fails on many counts, which I have discussed is some detail elsewhere (2001, forthcoming). In its Maxwellian-Worrallian stripe, structural realism improves on the Russellian version by denying the inferential route. The world has excess structure over the appearances, but, the thought is, this excess structure can be captured (hypothetico-deductively, as it were) by the Ramsey-sentence of an empirically adequate theory. If there are reasons to think that this Ramsey-sentence is true as well as empirically adequate, the structure of the world ‘behind’ the appearances can be known. The chief problem with this view, diagnosed by many philosophers, is that, on a Ramsey-sentence account of theories, it turns out that an empirically adequate theory is true (cf. my 1999, xxxx & forthcoming). The supposed ‘excess’ structure of the world is, so to speak, illusory. 
One point brought home by the discussion over the prospects of constructive empiricism is that we should take seriously the idea that the world may have ‘excess structure’ over the appearances. A theory describes a way the world might be and an empirically adequate theory might be false. So the world might be different from the way it is described by an empirically adequate theory. This idea is not honoured by structural realism, unless it drives a wedge between empirical adequacy and truth.​[4]​ This wedge can be driven in position only if it is accepted that the world has already built into it a natural structure, a structure that the Ramsey-sentence of the theory might fail to capture. This is a non-structural principle. And since we are talking about the world, this has to be an in re structure. Actually, structural realism in both of its foregoing stripes, is not pure structuralism. It treats the world as a relational system with objects and properties and relations. Its point is epistemic rather than ontic. The point then is that the epistemic claim that only structure can be known comes to nothing. To cut a long story short, given that we talk about in re structures, there are objects that ‘fill’ the structures, these objects have properties over and above those that are determined by their interrelationships within the structure, (at least) some of these (non-structural) properties are knowable (e.g., that they are not abstract entities, that they are in space and time, that they have causal powers etc.) and, in any case, these in re structures are individuated by their non-structural properties since it is in virtue of these (non-structural) properties that they have causal unity, play any causal role they do, and are distinguished from other in re structures.
Moral: Epistemic structural realism promises that the ‘excess structure’ of the world can be known, but fails to deliver on its promise unless more than structure can be known.
	Let us return, briefly, to structural empiricism. Recall that it takes scientific theories literally and rests on the notion of truth as correspondence. This means that it takes seriously the possibility that the world might well have excess structure over the appearances. After all, the world must have excess structure if one of the many incompatible theoretical models of the appearances is to be correct (whether or not science can or need find this out). But for this excess structure to exist it should be causally connected to the structure of appearances. Well, one might say, this excess structure might exist in complete causal isolation, as it were. But this thought would be revisionary of actual science. And it would leave totally unmotivated the view that theories should be taken at face value, as telling a causally unified story as to how the world might be. A scientific theory does not describe two causally disconnected systems (the system of appearances and the system of what happens ‘behind’ them). Rather, it tells a story as to how these two systems are causally connected. Structural empiricism should at least leave it open that the excess structure of the world is causally connected to the structure of appearances. The price for this is that structural empiricism buys into a substantive metaphysical assumption: that it is at least possible that the structure of appearances is causally connected to a deeper unobservable structure. 
Moral: What structural empiricism may gain in epistemology (that this excess structure cannot or need not be known) is paid back in metaphysics (that this excess structure is a causal extension of the structure of appearances). 

4. And nothing but the structure. Ontic structuralism is supposed to be a substantive thesis. The structure of the world (which, presumably, is all there is) is a causal structure. French and Ladyman (2003a, 75) write: “(W)e acknowledged that causal relations constitute a fundamental feature of the structure of the world”. Based on this acknowledgement, they deny that physical structures are identical to mathematical ones. We have already seen that this implies that structures are in re and that this commitment undermines pure structuralism. In what follows, I shall show that ontic structuralism cannot accommodate causation within the structuralist slogan.
	There seems to be a prima facie promising way to understand causation in a structuralist framework: we can think of it as structure-persistence or structure-preservation. This approach has found its clearest general form in Russell’s (1948) structural postulate. Events (complex structures) form causal chains, where the members of the chain are similar in structure. The idea here is that causation involves structural persistence without qualitative persistence. However, as Russell himself recognised, there are causal changes that do not involve structure-persistence, e.g., the explosion of a bomb. Besides, we need to specify in a more precise way what exactly it is that persists. For in any process, and with enough ingenuity, something that persists can always be found. We need, therefore, an account of those characteristics of a process whose persistence makes this process causal. The natural candidate for such an account should involve objects and their properties. These properties can be understood as universals or as tropes. But whatever the details are, persistence cannot be purely structural. We might, for instance, understand persistence in terms of energy conservation. Yet, energy is not a purely structural property of a system. 
To see that structural persistence is not enough for causation consider what I call the ‘which is which’ problem. Suppose that a causal chain consists in some kind of structural similarity between events c and e. Suppose also that we accept the strong view that this structural similarity is all there is to causation. Which then is the cause and which the effect? Structural considerations alone cannot afford us a distinction: cause and effect are isomorphic. A corollary of this is that structural considerations alone cannot distinguish between a case of persistence (where an event persists over time) and a case of change (where an event causes another event to happen). Both cases are structurally identical if causation consists in structural continuity. Another corollary is that structural considerations cannot distinguish between two isomorphic (but qualitative distinct) systems which of them is the cause of a certain event. One might try to avoid these by taking structures to be in space and time and by arguing, for instance, that the cause is the structure that precedes in time the other structures. This, to say the least, would take structures to be in re. Only concrete systems can be in space and time. Now, being in space and time are not structural properties. So non-structural properties are necessary for causal relations. In any case, if the focus is on in re systems, then cause and effect can be distinguished in virtue of their qualitative (non-structural) properties and relations.
	But even if we leave all this behind, we can still question the rationale for taking causation to be exhausted by a chain of isomorphic structures. If causation is a relation of dependence between events (where dependence can be understood in any of the standard ways: nomological, counterfactual, probabilistic), then it should be clear that the idea of isomorphism between cause and effect is undermined. There is nothing in causation-as-dependence which dictates that cause and effect should share structure. If ‘c causes e’ is understood in any of the above dependence-senses (e.g., e counterfactually depends on c and the like), c and e any have any structure whatever. What if we take causation as a productive relation between events? If we take the cause to produce, or bring about, the effect, or if we think there is a mechanism that connects cause and effect, we might also think that structure-persistence or structure-transference offer the local tie that links cause and effect. Indeed, if we think that there can be nothing in the effect that was not already present in the cause, that the effect has a structure isomorphic to the structure of the cause seems to be a plausible claim. 
	Note an irony. If we take the line above, that c causes e depends on a non-structural principle. The relation of transference of structure from one event to another is not structural. Two events (or systems) may have the same structure though they are not causally connected. That this structural similarity is due to a causal connection between them is a non-structural claim. It cannot depend solely on the structural properties of the events (or systems). In any case, for reasons already noted above, we need to treat structures in an in re way. We cannot then claim that what is being transferred is pure structure. In re structures have objects with properties and relations and when they cause something else to happen it is by virtue of them and not by virtue of their structure, understood abstractly. 
I think Chakravartty (2003) has come to a similar conclusion when he notes that if we take ‘relations without relata’ it is hard to understand causal connections. In particular, he argues, there is no longer “an active principle that transforms [a] set of relations into another” (2003, 872). In light of the above, Chakravartty’s point may well be that an understanding of causation as a productive relation is at odds with OS. He, however, concedes that ontic structural realism might have a way out of this problem. It might just accept that “events might be analysed in terms of brute successions of structures” (2003, 873). In other words, OS might take causation to be a weak dependence relation: one structure follows the other. What I want to stress is that ontic structural realists cannot have it both ways. If they go for Chakravartty’s suggestion, then they can no longer claim that causation consists in structure-preservation or transference. Besides, if they go for Chakravartty’s suggestion, they will inherit all the well-known problems with understanding modality within a regularity account of causation.
Another way to highlight the problems that ontic structuralism has with accommodating causation concerns the causal relata. Standardly, the relata are taken to be either events or facts. It doesn’t matter for the present purposes which view is the correct one. On either view, causal relations depend on objects having properties and standing in relations to each other. Perhaps, a Davidsonian view of events might seem congenial to ontic structuralism: events are particulars that can be described in a number of ways. Let’s not make heavy whether of the objection that events can cause anything only in virtue of their properties. The relevant point here is that Davidsonian events are in re: they are in space and time. Hence, they cannot be abstract structures. Notice, a propos, that there is an interesting but innocuous way to understand the structuralist claim. Most objects (with the exception of fundamental particles) are structured complexes. Events or facts involving these objects will involve their structure. Consequently, their structure (e.g, the structure of a molecule) is causally relevant to what these objects can do. But these are in re structures: they depend on the properties and relations these objects have. There is no entry point for ontic structuralism here. To put the point bluntly: the truth-makers of causal claims require objects and properties.  
Could ontic structuralism adopt causal structuralism? As John Hawthorne (2001) explains it, causal structuralism is the view that all there is to properties is their causal profile, that is the causal powers they confer on their possessors. It is a structuralist view because it denies quidditism, the view that there is something to a property—a quiddity—over and above its causal profile. We may think of causal structuralism as the view that properties have no intrinsic nature over and above their causal profile. So, for every property (i.e. for every non-logical or non-mathematical property), there isn’t its causal role (profile) and its ‘role filler’; there is only its causal role. If ontic structuralism is taken to be causal structuralism, then it amounts to the denial of quidditism. Is this, however, progress? First, it’s not obvious that quidditism is wrong. But suppose it is. Causal structuralism does not eliminate or avoid properties altogether. It dispenses with their quiddities, but, as a matter of fact, it accommodates properties and secures their existence and causal efficacy via their causal profile. Ontic structuralism would in fact require a kind of causal hyperstructuralism (cf. Hawthorne 2001, 373), whereby causal profiles are purely structural. But then we end up with nothing but a formal structure, with no substantive properties and relations to tell us what this structure is, how it causes anything to happen etc. Second, causal structuralism would commit ontic structuralism to a substantive account of causation, where causal facts are determined by the causal powers of properties. But this account of causation cannot be purely structural or formal. Causal facts would depend on the causal powers themselves and not on their structure or formal properties (whatever that means). The bottom line, I think, is that causal structuralism is at odds with the slogan that structure is all there is.
A final thought. Causal powers may be taken to be intrinsic properties of their bearers (cf. Langton 1998, 111 & 117). If so, it’s difficult, if at all possible, to claim that causal structure does not supervene on intrinsic properties. OS would have to take causal powers to be extrinsic properties. It could then be possible that the causal structure of the world be non-supervenient on intrinsic properties, as OS requires. This does not yet entail that there are no intrinsic properties (or object that possess them). But it would make prima facie plausible the claim that the causal structure of the world is ontologically basic. There is a price for this move, however: laws of nature have to be contingent. If they are contingent, then causal powers are extrinsic in that the intrinsic properties of things do not fix their causal powers; the latter depend on what laws there are (cf. Langton, op.cit., 118-9). This opens a can of worms that I cannot enter into here. Suffice it to stress a problem for MOSR. In light of the above, the causal structure of the world amounts to its nomological structure. It is the latter that is ontologically basic in that it does not supervene on the intrinsic properties of things and determines what causal powers they have. If laws are contingent, then it is a ‘brute’ fact what laws there are, and hence what the nomological structure of the world is. There are two options for a realist construal of the nomological structure of the world. First, it is a network of cosmic regularities; second, it is a network of nomic necessitating relations among properties. On the first option, there are well-known problems for the claim that this structure is modal. On the second option, modality might be secured but at the price of positing a mysterious relation of necessitation. On either option, the nomological structure of the world is not all that there is: neither regularities nor necessitating relations among properties are purely structural. 
	Moral: By going modal, OS promises to close the gap between abstract ante rem structures and concrete in re ones. But the modal features of the world are not purely structural. Nor can causation be anything like ‘the cement of the universe’ if structure is all there is. Worse, I don’t think we can make sense of causation if structure is all there is. 
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^1	  Dummett (1991, 295), Shapiro (1997, 85). See also Byerly (1969). 
^2	  For more on this see Reck & Price (2000).
^3	  Some similar thoughts are expressed in Busch (2003). 
^4	  As Demopoulos (2003, 390) has persuasively argued, in the end of the day, constructive empiricism too collapses truth to empirical adequacy.
